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The legal enforceability of surrogate motherhood is largely contested in bioethics. In this paper, I argue 
against what Debra Satz terms the “asymmetry thesis,” the idea that there should be an asymmetry 
(basically, a difference) between how we treat reproductive labor and other forms of labor. Satz’s main 
support for the asymmetry thesis is that if contract pregnancies are legally enforced, they reinforce a long 
history of the gender inequality that is pervasive in our culture. I contend that this is not well-supported, 
and identify three salient empirical questions that the ethicist must ask the sociologist before defending 
the asymmetry thesis: questions on the population’s thoughts about the sale of reproductive labor, on 




On March 27, 1986, Melissa Stern, known to many as “Baby M” was born to Mary 
Beth Whitehead, her genetic mother who had been artificially inseminated with the 
sperm of William Stern. Within a day of transferring custody of Baby M to the Sterns, 
Whitehead asked for Baby M to be returned to her, threatening suicide. After a series of 
judicial debates, a family court awarded custody of the baby to the Sterns and visitation 
rights to Whitehead. The Baby M case brings to mind many questions about the legal 
enforceability1 of pregnancy contracts. Philosophers such as Elizabeth Anderson 
present the essentialist argument that there is an intrinsically immoral aspect of paid 
surrogate motherhood: it commodifies both the babies that are born and surrogate 
mothers’ reproductive capacities, and thus it should not be legally enforceable. 
Alternatively, Richard A. Posner weighs several consequential worries about this 
                                               
1
 To clarify the distinction between moral permissibility and legal enforceability, I am primarily 
concerned with evaluating the morality of a market in legally enforceable contracts for surrogate 
motherhood, rather than the moral permissibility of the act of contract pregnancy itself. This is because 
without legal enforcement, a market in surrogacy contracts would not be possible. As Satz writes in her 
book Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale, “all markets depend on background property rules and a 
complex of social, cultural, and legal institutions for their operation” (15). 
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enforcement, ultimately concluding that the contracts should be legal but that more 
evidence is required for a definitive answer. 
 
One of these consequences that requires more empirical evidence to corroborate is the 
idea that surrogacy contracts reinforce gender inequalities. In her essay “Markets in 
Women’s Reproductive Labor,” Debra Satz describes the “asymmetry thesis,” the idea 
that there should be an asymmetry (basically, a difference) between how we treat 
reproductive labor and other forms of labor (107). Satz criticizes three ways of 
defending the thesis and offers an alternative argument that says that contract 
pregnancies should not be legally enforced because they reinforce a long history of 
gender inequalities. In this paper I will critique the asymmetry thesis as a method of 
arguing against the legal enforceability of surrogate motherhood. First, I will briefly 
assess (and ultimately agree with) Satz’s initial criticisms of three common ways to 
defend the asymmetry thesis—considerations about the special nature of reproductive 
labor, the special bonds of motherhood, and malevolent consequences for children. But 
in the second part of my paper, I will demonstrate that as long as women are given 
sufficient information and bargaining power in negotiating surrogacy contracts, Satz’s 
concerns about bolstering gender stereotypes are not so worrisome. Because the 
validity of these arguments depends on empirical evidence, I will also identify the 
salient questions which, as Posner suggests, require more sociological and economic 
evidence to answer—questions on the population’s thoughts about the sale of 
reproductive labor, on how many surrogates regret their decisions, and on the impact of 
contract pregnancy on the mother-child relationship. In doing so, I will demonstrate 
why, without the answers to these questions, one cannot affirm the asymmetry thesis. 
 
 
Flaws in the Three Arguments that Support the Asymmetry Thesis 
 
Satz’s arguments against the three common ways of supporting the asymmetry thesis 
are strong; nonetheless, Satz does not explicitly state what components of her 
arguments require empirical data. First, she argues against the essentialist idea, the 
thought that “the intrinsic nature of reproductive labor is different from that of other 
kinds of labor” (110). Essentialists argue that there are certain facts of reproductive 
labor that make it unlike other forms of labor—the fact that it involves genetics, the fact 
that many phases of the reproductive process are involuntary, the fact that reproductive 
labor lasts nine months, and the fact that the woman’s behavior (and control over her 
body) is significantly restricted during pregnancy. Satz suggests that none of these facts 
are reasons to object against the commodification of surrogacy contacts; she gives 
examples of other types of labor that we feel are appropriate to commodify, and 
explains how the aforementioned facts apply just as well to those types of labor. Her 
first example is voluntary military service: it lasts over a long period of time, involves 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                           Burstein | 19 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
involuntary labor,2 and gives others access to one’s body. Nonetheless, our society does 
not seem to have issues with the commodification of military service. Neither do we 
think it is wrong for a man to sell his sperm, so the fact that some contract pregnancies 
involve genetic ties is not a satisfactory reason to oppose their commodification. I agree 
with Satz’s arguments here, and I would further add that most commodification debates 
are simply a matter of opinion. While some feel that selling reproductive labor 
commodifies it in an inappropriate way, others may have no objection to it. Thus, the 
only way to correctly use the essentialist argument as support for the asymmetry thesis 
is to provide some empirical data which shows that more people oppose the market in 
surrogacy contracts than those that do not (if there are more, then by utilitarian 
rationale, the market might not provide a net benefit).3 
 
The second argument for the asymmetry thesis that Satz critiques is the idea that 
commodifying reproductive labor degrades the mother-fetus and mother-child bond. 
Some say that contract pregnancies commodify the children (imagine the situation 
where the intended parents are “shopping” for certain characteristics of their child) and 
could amount to baby-selling. Satz’s responses are that not all mothers have a bond 
with their fetuses or children (some women abort and other women, for whatever 
reasons, do not feel a strong emotional connection to their children). Also she writes 
that the contract system can be regulated so that the intended parents cannot reject 
children that are born with some unintended physical characteristics. Thus these 
rejection worries are no different from the same worries that one might have about a 
mother giving birth to her own natural child. Again, I agree with Satz: her reasoning is 
supported by Posner’s finding that “on average, adopted children are no more unhappy 
or unstable than natural children” combined with the fact that the child of a surrogate is 
only half-adopted (23-24). To fully confirm these ideas, a sociologist should study the 
relationships between children born to surrogate mothers and their legal parents; if, for 
whatever reason, there are a greater number of unsuccessful (non-loving) relationships 
between these than between mothers and their natural children, then there is a good 
reason to ban contract pregnancies.  
 
The last argument that Satz argues against is the idea that pregnancy contracts do not 
adequately take the interests of the child into account. I think Satz gives an appropriate 
response—a child’s best interests will not always be served best by the child’s 
biological parents. Furthermore, Satz makes explicit the need for empirical data to 
show whether or not contract pregnancy threatens children’s interests. Having briefly 
                                               
2
 For example, there are probably many times when a soldier is pushed to risk his life to a greater extent 
than he would otherwise.  
 
3
 An extensive analysis of (1) whether or not utilitarianism is the appropriate moral philosophy to apply 
in this case and (2) whether or not the fact that more people agree with the essentialist idea makes the ban 
justifiable is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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overviewed Satz’s critiques of three main arguments used to support the asymmetry 
thesis (and having made more explicit which questions require empirical data to 






Satz contends that the strongest argument supporting the asymmetry thesis is that 
surrogacy contracts reinforce gender inequality. She explains, “it is the background 
gender inequality that makes the commodification of women's and children's attributes 
especially objectionable” (123). Satz further clarifies that her argument deals mainly 
with third party cultural effects (Discussion March 12, 2010). She is not primarily 
worried about the effects of the contract on the surrogate mother herself; rather, she is 
concerned with the way that others will view and treat the female gender when they are 
aware of the fact that women can sell their reproductive capacities. First, I will provide 
a general critique of this argument and then analyze Satz’s specific sub-arguments. 
 
While it is entirely possible that a market in surrogacy contracts may lead to gender 
inequalities, it is not probable that this contribution is significant enough to warrant a 
ban. For example, imagine a man named Bob who feels that women are not equal to 
men in terms of their rights and roles because of the gender inequality, that, as Satz 
says, is “pervasive” in our society. Bob’s views represent the third party cultural effect 
that Satz is worried about—observing that women’s roles in society are unequal, he 
comes to the conclusion that this is how it should be, thus confounding descriptive and 
normative feminism [1]. Now, say that Bob has two sisters: one decides to engage in a 
surrogacy contract while the other becomes a babysitter. Both cases may further Bob’s 
views of gender inequality. Thinking of his sister the babysitter, Bob’s view that 
females’ jobs revolve more around childcare (than those of males) may be slightly 
furthered. Similarly, while noticing that the other sister is a surrogate mother, his views 
of women as “baby machines” may also be bolstered.4 But if Bob’s gender stereotypes 
are slightly reinforced by his sister’s job as a babysitter, does this justify a legal ban on 
the market in babysitters? The same argument applies to Satz’s idea: the fact that there 
are some women who engage in a market in surrogacy contracts may bolster others’ 
gender stereotypes, but this is not enough to justify a ban. Again, to arrive at a definite 
answer, the philosopher would have to call upon the sociologist or the economist to 
answer several questions: when surrogacy contracts are legally enforceable, how many 
women use them? Is this number large enough to make a significant impact on gender 
                                               
4
 It is improbable that Bob actually thought of the specific term “baby machine” or saw that as the 
woman’s only role but it is probable that he sees reproduction as one of the female’s central roles. 
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stereotypes?5 Regardless of the number of people that participate, does the legality of 
the market itself significantly reinforce these stereotypes? Until there is sufficient proof 
that this reinforcement of views will indeed happen, there is no evident reason to see 
the gender inequality hypothesis as valid support for the asymmetry thesis.  
 
I will now turn to Satz’s specific sub-arguments for the gender inequality hypothesis—
the body control argument, the labor argument, and the gestational-genetic argument, 
and show how they are weakened by the fact that they ignore the particular contract 
terms and background conditions involved with surrogacy scenarios. 
 
 
I. Body Control 
 
Satz’s “body control argument” is that giving others access and control over women's 
bodies and sexuality reinforces a long history of the unequal treatment of women. 
Because a contract pregnancy requires for a woman’s behavior to be highly controlled, 
it can involve a great deal of manipulation and coercion.  
 
I think that as long as women have the necessary information and requisite bargaining 
power, the body control argument will not be valid because the surrogacy contract will 
be negotiable and reversible. When I say that a woman has “requisite bargaining 
power,” I mean that she is not in a situation of dire coercion—her financial situation is 
such that she (and her family, if she has one) has some minimum level of wealth that is 
enough to meet her (or their) basic needs.6 Also, she is not coerced into a contract 
pregnancy for any other reason (because some friend or spouse is forcing her to do so, 
for example); her decision to have a contract pregnancy is rational and voluntary. 
Furthermore, by “requisite bargaining power,” I also mean that she is not just presented 
a contract by a dealer but has an in-depth discussion of the contract’s details; she does 
not become manipulated because she has the opportunity to negotiate specific terms of 
the contract. At the least, she will be offered to include contract terms stating some 
retributive price that she can pay for defaulting, aborting, and visitation rights if she 
                                               
5
 Posner provides sociological facts that show why the number would not be large enough to make a 
significant impact: “Very few fertile couples will be interested in surrogate motherhood; most couples 
are fertile; and the fraction of infertile couples is bound to decline with continued advances in medical 
technology, even as women marry later (fertility problems increase with age)” (27). 
 
6
 If this is not the case, then a confounding variable is coercion, the worry described by Michael Sandel 
in “What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets.” The concern is that people are forced to 
participate in a market out of dire economic necessity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that 
because of the coercion worry, contract pregnancies should not be enforceable. I am open to this 
conclusion being possible, but in this paper I reason within a theoretical framework where this worry 
does not exist so that I can evaluate whether or not the gender inequality hypothesis is morally troubling 
on its own. 
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changes her mind about giving the child away. If she has trouble understanding the 
terms of the contract, there should be an impartial third party present to help her. The 
Baby M contract includes no provision of what happens if Whitehead wants to default 
[2]. Such a flaw suggests that Whitehead did not meet my criterion of sufficient 
bargaining power. 
 
By “necessary information,” I mean that the mother has been sufficiently warned of the 
possibility of emotional attachment to the child that she gestates. Of course no woman 
has complete information at the time of the contract since no woman knows what it will 
be like to have a child before he or she is born (even if that woman has already had 
children before, there is still some uncertainty about how it will feel to have this new 
child). However, this is true for most parties that sign a contract – there is always some 
degree of uncertainty at stake and in most cases, this is the main purpose for the 
contract existing in the first place. Posner provides the evidence that “most surrogate 
mothers already have children and that few are under twenty years of age;” from this he 
reasons that “a mature woman who has borne children should be able to estimate the 
psychic cost to her of giving up her next baby” (25). This fact suggests that some 
women may already satisfy my criterion of “necessary information.” Determining the 
precise standards for what amounts to “necessary information” is the work of 
psychology or public policy; I will take it to be the most accurate and complete 
portrayal of what it is like to be a surrogate mother.7 Furthermore, to fully understand 
whether or not the woman has sufficient information when negotiating the contract, one 
would have to conduct a sociological study about the number of women who regret 
entering into a surrogacy contract.8 
 
Under these conditions of full information and necessary bargaining power, Satz’s 
concern that “contract pregnancy gives others increased access to and control over the 
women’s body and sexuality” will not be so worrisome (124). With her bargaining 
power, a woman who decides to do a contract pregnancy can always establish some 
high price that she will be willing to pay in order to keep the child. She can add further 
terms to the contract such as the opportunity to abort as long as she pays some other 
high price. Thus she has the chance to make the surrogacy contract reversible in several 
different ways. One might argue that if the woman is allowed to name some price at 
which she can default and keep the baby, then no one will want to enter the contract 
deal with her. In this scenario the market will self-regulate so as to ensure a fair 
outcome. If the price is high enough such that a couple will be willing to pursue the 
contract and take the risk of the mother defaulting, then the contract is a pareto 
                                               
7
 Perhaps a video of various surrogates speaking of their experiences in hindsight will be useful, in 




 I credit this consideration to Sara Mrsny. 
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improvement9 for both parties.10 The couple is made better off because in the case of a 
default, they are compensated for some of the time and energy they put into the contract 
and the anticipation of the baby. Likewise, the surrogate is made better off because she 
knows the price that she has to pay if she wants to default.11 Provided that the woman 
can default at a price and act according to the contract terms that she negotiated, she 
maintains control of her body throughout the surrogacy contract (the law simply 
requires here to adhere to the consequences that she agreed to in the contract).  
 
So while Satz is correct in saying that “contract pregnancy gives others increased 
access to and control over women’s bodies and sexuality,” this “increased access” 
never trumps the woman’s own control because she always has an exit option—she can 
break the contract and pay the price. Thus, the “increased access” is not great enough to 
suggest that it reinforces gender inequalities. Just like a modeling agency may require a 
model to maintain a certain weight and exclude her from a shoot if she does not 
maintain that weight, a pregnancy contract will provide retribution for a surrogate 
mother who does not keep the terms of the contract. In no way does this retribution 





Secondly, Satz is concerned with what I will refer to as the “labor” argument: the fact 
that pregnancy contracts “entrench a traditional division of labor—men at work, 
women in the home—based on gender” (126). This argument also includes the idea that 
surrogacy contracts reinforce the view of women as “baby machines.” I agree with Satz 
that the current sexual division of labor is unjust (more women are involved in unpaid 
domestic work and it is true that there are a “limited range of economic opportunities 
available to these women”). However, I disagree with the idea that the existence of a 
market in surrogacy contracts significantly “entrenches” this division of labor. To avoid 
being repetitive, I will refer back to the Bob example I used to argue against Satz’s 
general argument about gender inequality. The third party effects (Bob seeing women’s 
roles as in the home and more geared towards childcare) are possible but not significant 
enough to justify a ban (and thus not weighty enough to support the asymmetry thesis). 
 
                                               
9
 A pareto improvement is when “one’s utility [is] increased without reducing the utility of someone 
else” (Satz 18).  
 
10
 Posner has an objection about the presence of a nonconsenting third party (the baby) weakening the 
case for pareto optimality but to answer this concern I would use Satz’s arguments (explained above) 
about the mother-child bond not necessarily being worse than the usual mother-child bond.  
 
11
 The baby’s interests are not counted because one cannot define what a pareto improvement would be 
for someone whose initial condition (pre-improvement) is not existing as a person. 
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Nonetheless, the labor argument has a component that is not addressed by my earlier 
analysis of the general inequality hypothesis. Satz writes, “while some women may 
‘prefer’ to stay at home, we need to pay attention to the limited range of economic 
opportunities available to these women, and to the ways in which these opportunities 
have shaped their preferences” (127). Here, Satz is expressing a concern about the 
combined effect of gender inequalities and economic inequalities. However, there are 
several reasons that this concern is not relevant. Posner explains that couples would not 
want the babies of “a desperately poor woman,” and that “interviews with surrogate 
mothers indicate […] that they are not poor” (25). Most surrogate mothers explain that 
with the $10,000 (or other amount that they earn) they would spend on “home 
improvement, a new car, a better education for their children,” which Posner 
characterizes as “middle-class answers” (25-26). He further states that many of these 
women are chiefly motivated by altruism and “empathy for the father’s infertile wife.” 
Thus the majority of women who become surrogate mothers do not do so because they 
are coerced by dire financial situations. So while Satz may be correct in claiming that 
there are women who stay at home due to a “limited range of economic opportunities,” 
many of these women are not the same ones who choose to and are chosen to become 
surrogate mothers. This fact weakens Satz’s idea that pregnancy contracts provide “a 
monetary incentive” for women to remain in the home. Once more, a sociological study 
could confirm the number of women who actually do become surrogates solely for 
financial gains, and if this number is statistically significant, one might have a Sandel-
type coercion worry (see footnote 6). As mentioned before, I am open to the coercion 
worry justifying a ban on contract pregnancies, but this question is not the focus of my 
paper. 
 
Satz might respond in saying that while the women who become surrogate mothers are 
not desperate, they may (perhaps due to a weak job market) find it convenient to stay at 
home and make some extra cash as surrogate mothers. In this case it is true that the 
contracts are a monetary incentive for those women to stay in their homes, but the 
degree to which this contributes to gender stereotypes is probably not significant, 
especially compared to the influences of other, more pervasive markets (markets in 
babysitters, models, porno stars, et cetera). Posner’s data (in footnote 4) about the small 
size of the contract pregnancy market provide further reason to believe that its impact 






Thirdly, Satz is concerned with the fact that surrogate motherhood does not take into 
account the woman’s gestational contributions (only her genetic ones). She explains 
that in the Baby M case, Whitehead won visitation rights to Baby M because she was 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                           Burstein | 25 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
the genetic mother; the courts ignored Whitehead’s gestational contribution and in 
doing so, defined her rights similar to those of men, failing to recognize that unlike 
men, women contribute more than just genetics to their children.  
 
I draw upon Posner for the main flaw that I identify in Satz’s gestational-genetic 
argument. Referring to the Baby M case, Posner writes, “we must be wary of 
generalizing from a single case” (25). As long as they satisfy my aforementioned 
criteria of sufficient information and bargaining power, both gestational and 
gestational-genetic mothers have the opportunity to negotiate contract terms that they 
deem appropriate (in terms of visitation rights, the default option, et cetera). The fact 
that historically, there have been some court cases in which a gestational surrogate 
(Satz provides the example of Anna Johnson) was denied rights to the child does not 
mean that this has to or will be the case in any market in surrogacy contracts. Rather, 
the surrogates in those conditions simply did not satisfy the “fair bargaining conditions” 
criterion. In the Johnson case, for example, Anna was not offered to name a price for 
visitation rights. With fair bargaining power, it is the mother’s responsibility to shape 
the contract as she wishes (if she is doing a gestational surrogacy and feels that there is 
some small chance she will develop an attachment to the child, she can name some 
price that she will pay for visitation rights). Of course, a gestational tie to a child is 
weaker than a combination of a genetic and gestational tie, and thus, the price for 
visitation rights to a solely gestational child will probably be higher in most cases. But 
in no way would this higher price directly encourage the stereotype of women as 
“incubators of men’s seeds” (Satz simply does not provide any evidence to corroborate 
this). Thus, Satz’s concern that “the court’s inattention to women’s unique labor 
contribution is itself a form of unequal treatment” is not due to some inherent flaw in 
the surrogacy contract market; rather, it is due to improper or incomplete negotiation on 
the part of the surrogate (128). 
 
Considering all of the weaknesses in Satz’s gender inequality argument, it is difficult to 
see the validity of Satz’s conclusion about the asymmetry thesis: “The asymmetries of 
gender—the fact of social relations of gender domination—provide the best foundation 
for the asymmetry thesis” (130). Not only does she lack a foolproof argument about 
how a market in surrogacy contracts would reinforce gender stereotypes, but also, she 
never explains why considerations of gender provide the “best foundation for the 
asymmetry thesis.” She briefly considers the market’s other effects such as the 
reinforcement of racial inequalities and stereotypes, but never gives a specific reason as 
to why considerations of gender are better support for the asymmetry thesis then, say, 
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Banning Contract Pregnancies May Itself Degrade Women 
 
Having shown why Satz’s defense of the asymmetry thesis is not probable, I will 
briefly suggest (though in no way prove) that banning surrogacy contracts might itself 
reinforce gender inequality. I agree with Posner’s idea that a market in contract 
pregnancies helps deny the idea that “biology is destiny, that it is women’s predestined 
lot to be a bearer and raiser of children” (28). Since feminism seeks to give women 
equal rights, the option of surrogate motherhood supports feminism in the sense that it 
“seeks to expand the opportunities of women beyond the traditional role […] of being a 
housewife and mother who makes a career of bearing and raising children” (28). For 
example, a woman highly involved in her corporation may be seen as less useful to the 
business since she has to take maternity leave while the company is executing a crucial 
project. If she takes the leave, this will remind her entire company of the gender 
stereotype of the woman as the bearer of children. With a legal surrogate market, she 
has the option to hire another woman to have a child for her,12 enabling her to 
contribute more to the company, (potentially) earn a higher salary, and avoid having the 
third party cultural effect on her co-workers (Section February 25, 2010). In addition, 
this market enables homosexuals to raise genetically related children, which helps 
erode the traditional idea that children can only be born to and raised by a married 
woman.  
 
Furthermore, the assumption that women are not competent enough to negotiate a 
contract that they can adhere to might itself be demeaning to the female's decision-
making abilities. A key issue with feminist ideas about women becoming exploited in 
contract pregnancies is presented by Posner: “The idea that women are particularly 
prone to be exploited in the marketplace hearkens back to the time when married 
women were deemed legally incompetent to make enforceable contracts.” Returning to 
my arguments about the requisite criteria of fair bargaining conditions and sufficient 
information, I contend that in order for the market in surrogacy contracts to avoid 
manipulation or coercion of the woman, the lawyer writing the contract must ensure 
that the woman has voluntarily agreed to every term in the contract. As long as this 
happens, the only case in which a problematic situation will arise is when the woman 
changes her mind so as to break some term of the contract. Banning the market because 
of such a worry puts little faith in the woman’s decision-making power, potentially 
contributing to the same third party cultural effect that Satz is concerned with; people’s 
views that woman are docile, easily manipulated, or bad decision-makers may be 
furthered.  
 
                                               
12
 Consideration of the worrisome scenario where the rich women (or women of one particular race) are 
hiring surrogates in the same way that they hire housecleaners is important, but again, deals more with 
socioeconomic and racial inequality rather than gender inequality, and thus is beyond the scope of my 
analysis (Section February 25, 2010).  
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Finally, considerations of body autonomy further support the idea that surrogacy 
contracts bolster gender equality. Kant argued that autonomy is the fundamental 
organizing principle of all morality; without it, one cannot impose any other moral laws 
on oneself (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). An extensive analysis of the 
importance of autonomy is outside the scope of this paper. My point is simply that 
letting the surrogate mother decide what to do with her body supports her freedom and 
autonomy, similar to the way that a mother’s freedom to choose bolsters the woman’s 





Had my criteria of full information and necessary bargaining conditions been fulfilled 
in the Baby M case, much of the moral controversy would have been eliminated. 
Whitehead might have agreed to some price that she could pay for visitation rights, for 
example. Many of our worries with surrogacy contracts stem from regulation and 
enforcement issues rather than the legality of the contracts themselves.  
 
Throughout this essay, I have analyzed several weaknesses the asymmetry thesis. 
Along the way, I have collected a set of questions that a sociologist or economist would 
need to answer in order to give a full-proof answer to the question of the legal 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts: Does the majority of the population worry about 
the commodification of the woman's reproductive labor? Are mother-child relationships 
worse for non-natural mothers than for natural ones? What percentage of surrogates 
regret their decision to engage in contract pregnancy? Until these are answered, it is 
faulty to assume that any of the four arguments that Satz provides are valid support for 
the asymmetry thesis. Thus, one would be mistaken to use any of these arguments to 










[3] Satz, Debra. “Markets in Women’s Reproductive Labor” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs. Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 107-131. 
 
[4] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <plato.stanford.edu>  
 
Res Cogitans (2011) 2                                                                                                           Burstein | 28 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
[5] Posner, Richard A. “The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate 
Motherhood.”  
 
[6] Anderson, Elizabeth S. “Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs. Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 71-92. 
 
[7] Sandel, Michael J. “What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets” The 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values.  
 
